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Social Mobilizations in the Catalan Political 
Conflict 
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ABSTRACT 
Different kinds of evidence are put forward to make an argument 
and justify political action by agents situated in diverse social, cultural, 
and power positions. The Catalan political conflict is a case in point. The 
central Spanish government’s arguments are mostly of a juridical 
nature and rest on the anti-constitutionality of the Catalan government 
and other civil society organizations’ actions. Instead, most arguments 
of Catalan supporters of independence are based on historical 
interpretations of grievances referring to national institutions and 
identity. Supporters of independence, under the politically inspired 
actions of major civil society associations, have mobilized hundreds of 
thousands of Catalans in massive demonstrations and have used media 
in a very efficient manner. The judicial responses to the secessionist 
process have used legality (police, prison) to allow repression, while the 
repeated anti-constitutional actions of the Catalan government have 
been justified as legitimated by popular support and by a historical 
accumulation of grievances.  
At the same time, repeated elections show that Catalan citizens are 
divided and have very different positions regarding their support for 
independence. This differentiation can be mapped according to social 
and economic criteria and almost literally projected in spatial 
coordinates. This other group of Catalans tried to mobilize to publicly 
show their disagreement over the secessionist project. Yet their 
arguments appear as reactive rather than based on any alternative 
evidence. Hence, they are co-opted by the central Spanish various 
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governments’ juridical position, which supports a unified Spanish 
national identity couched in the Constitution of 1978. 
This paper argues that an important aspect of the political 
confrontation is being played as an evidence struggle where the various 
social actors produce different kinds of evidence to justify their actions 
in the political arena and mobilize support. 
 
Keywords: Catalan independence, symbolic evidence, legality, 
legitimacy, nationalism 
I. EVIDENCE STRUGGLES, AN INTRODUCTION 
The ongoing Catalan political conflict is historically deep and has 
many iterations.1 The present one is occurring in the context of a 
general rise of nationalist mobilizations in Europe following austerity 
policies implemented by neoliberal regimes, especially after the 2008 
crisis. At the turn of the century, Spain saw the conservative Popular 
Party (PP) win an absolute majority in the national Parliament.2 This 
event triggered a tacit end to the multiparty agreement of the 
Transition period (1975-1982) that had enabled the establishment of 
democracy and the rule of law under the 1978 Constitution, after the 
death of Franco. As a result of increased deregulation of land use and 
sub-prime credit from 1996, a housing bubble expanded and peaked, 
only to burst in 2008. A banking crisis followed, and Spanish banks had 
to be bailed out by the European Central Bank, subject to strict 
conditions: restraining public deficit (austerity) and deregulating the 
labor market (internal devaluation). After 2000, central governments 
(especially PP governments) in a movement of relative political re-
centralization challenged the structure of the state as described in the 
1978 Constitution which instituted the devolution of power to 
autonomous regions. This process became extremely aggressive after 
2012 when the conservative party regained power after two terms of 
social democrat government.3 One of the areas picked out for re-
                                                                                                     
 1. In this piece I limit the timeframe of the analysis to the events that occurred from 
September 2017 to May 2018. The juridical, political, and symbolic conflict is ongoing. 
 2. The Popular Party had won a majority in 1996, but because it did not have an 
absolute majority of seats, it was forced to manage other regional right wing parties—in 
particular the Catalan nationalist Convergència i Unió and the Basque nationalist Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco. In this conjuncture, the neoliberal interests overpowered Spanish 
nationalist interests, while regional nationalist elites leveraged their Parliamentary votes 
to earn some privileges. 
 3. The social democrat party PSOE had been in government for two election periods 
from 2004 to 2012. The second social democratic government of President Rodríguez 
Zapatero was to impose the first austerity measures, including a very controversial 
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centralization was education, a particularly sensitive domain for 
Catalonia’s autonomous language immersion system.4 Starting in 2010, 
the conflict of the nationalist Catalan and Spanish governments has 
acquired momentum and developed into a full-fledged institutional 
crisis. 
In the struggle, agents situated in diverse social, cultural, and 
power positions use different kinds of evidence to make an argument 
and justify political action. The central Spanish government’s 
arguments are mostly of a juridical nature and rest on the alleged anti-
constitutionality of the actions of members of the Catalan government 
and two civil society organizations (Òmnium, Assamblea Nacional 
Catalana). Instead, the Catalan supporters of independence rest their 
arguments on historical grievances referring to national institutions, 
fiscal inequity, and identity. Independence supporters, under the 
politically inspired actions of major civil society associations, have 
mobilized hundreds of thousands of Catalans in massive 
demonstrations, and have used media in a very efficient manner. The 
judicial responses to the secessionist process have used legality to allow 
repression (police violence on October, 1, 2017), while the Catalan 
government has justified repeated anti-constitutional actions as 
legitimated by “popular will,” and by the historical accumulation of 
grievances that the “Catalan people” hold against the central state.  
At the same time, repeated elections show that Catalan citizens are 
divided and have very different positions regarding support for 
independence. This differentiation relates to social and economic 
criteria and can be spatially mapped. This other group of Catalans tried 
to mobilize to publicly show their disagreement over the secessionist 
project. Yet their arguments appear as reactive rather than based on 
any alternative evidence. Hence, they are co-opted by the central 
Spanish various governments’ juridical positions, which supports a 
unified Spanish national identity, couched in the Constitution of 1978. 
This article argues that an important aspect of the political 
confrontation is being played as an evidence struggle, where the various 
social actors produce different kinds of evidence to justify their actions 
in the political arena and mobilize support. Evidence is used to make a 
legal case and includes direct and circumstantial forms. Evidence is 
                                                                                                     
expedite reform of the 1978 Constitution in order to include the public deficit ceiling in the 
Constitution, on the request of the European Commission, and the European Central 
Bank. See B.O.E. 2011, 233. Rodríguez Zapatero’s government also passed a Labor Law 
deregulating the labor market. See B.O.E. 2010, 227. A second Labor Law was passed by 
the conservative PP government extending deregulation. See B.O.E. 2012, 36. 
 4. See B.O.E. 2013, 295, at 97912-13 (“Disposición adicional trigésima octava. Lengua 
castellana, lenguas cooficiales y lenguas que gocen de protección legal.”). 
34 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 26:1 
used to make a moral case beyond legality and it includes mostly 
circumstantial evidence, especially historical forms of it. Finally, 
symbolic evidence is produced so as to incite emotional support. In this 
struggle for power and resources tied to territorial and cultural 
justification, these evidence struggles have saturated the political arena 
in such a way that other struggles are now invisible.  
II. AN OLD STORY 
The region of Catalonia has a long history of confrontation with 
Castilian power. This can be credited to the historical process of 
consolidation of the Spanish state, where different reigns preserving 
their statutes and privileges came to be dynastically united under the 
same Crown through the marriage of Isabel of Castile and Fernando of 
Aragon in the fifteenth century. During the sixteenth century, the 
power of Castile grew through colonization of the Americas and 
flourishing wool exports, while the commercial power of Catalonia (part 
of the Crown of Aragon) decreased as a result of the plague and of civil 
strife between the merchant and aristocratic elites and the peasant and 
artisan commoners. The Spanish Crown’s involvement in European 
wars during that period, however, increased conflicts around fiscal 
pressure and military levies that directly impacted Catalan rural and 
urban populations and curtailed the powers of local institutions. As a 
response, a popular revolt ensued in 1640, and Catalan institutions 
joined the French dominion for a short time, before falling back under 
Spanish rule.5 
As part of its statutes and privileges, the Principality of Catalonia 
had fiscal exemptions and a different jurisdiction. During the 
seventeenth century, Castile’s power was challenged by foreign powers 
and internal revolts while simultaneously the institutional structure of 
the nation was being transformed into a centralized Monarchy—a 
modern state structure that the Catalan elite understood as a process of 
Castilianization that marginalized the role of regional institutions and 
challenged their power. The Catalan Constitutions and institutions, 
however, with their body of laws and their autonomous relation to the 
Crown, lasted—albeit with temporary interruptions—until the outcome 
of the War of Spanish Succession (a confrontation between the 
Hapsburg claimant to the throne and the Bourbon claimant, Philip V) in 
1714. On September 11, 1714, the Bourbon troops entered Barcelona, 
                                                                                                     
 5. See generally JOHN H. ELLIOTT, THE REVOLT OF THE CATALANS: A STUDY IN THE 
DECLINE OF SPAIN (1598–1640) (1963) (studying the decline of Spanish rule in the 17th 
century and the Catalan revolt against military exactions that expressed the distancing of 
this region from Castilian monarchy). 
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and the Catalan region lost its Charters falling under the Decreto de 
Nueva Planta in 2016, basically being assimilated to the Castilian 
administrative realm albeit preserving its special civil law. This date 
was instituted as the Catalan national day in 1886. 
A Nineteeth Century Story 
The recent history of nation building in Catalonia is a nineteenth 
century story.6 It relates to European nation-state building and in 
particular to liberal (Enlightened period) models of the state which 
sought an end of ascribed privileges, a defense of private property, 
citizenship rule, equality before the law, and elected governing bodies. 
These enlightened models of the state were in confrontation with the 
privileges and structures of the Ancien Regime and with anti-liberal 
conservatism more generally. This history of nation building is also a 
struggle between class-based understandings of social conflict in the 
industrial centers and corporatist attempts to supersede them. 
A central aspect of this is the breakdown of paternalistic moral 
economies in agriculture and industry alike that were being replaced by 
class confrontations in the urban industrial areas. In Catalonia, the 
confrontation with the liberal central state is a strong factor leading to 
conflict in the rural hinterland. One example of these conflicts is the 
series of civil wars (Guerras Carlistas) in Catalonia and in other regions 
of Spain that sought a return of traditional governmental structures. 
Although these traditionalist conflicts are extremely complex and 
underwent many transformations, by the end of the century they were 
often presented as defending historical identity, regional rights (fueros 
or Charters), and “freedoms” against the centralizing and 
homogeneizing liberal state of Spain. The Catalonian traditionalist 
movement was conservative and corporatist with strongholds in Berga, 
Solsona, Vic, and Manresa and was strongly influenced by the Church.7 
For these traditional monarchists, the liberal centralizing state, with its 
uniformist trend, was seen as the first step toward egalitarianism and 
socialism. The first institution of the events of September 11, 1714, as 
the national Catalan celebration in 1886, for example, took the form of a 
Catholic holy mass organized by the conservative and traditionalist 
elites. Even so, the symbolic aspect of the event would explain that it 
                                                                                                     
 6. See ANGEL SMITH, THE ORIGINS OF CATALAN NATIONALISM, 1770–1898 (2014); 
JOSEP TERMES, DE LA REVOLUCIÓ DE SETEMBRE A LA FI DE LA GUERRA CIVIL (1868-1939) 
(1999). 
 7. See EL CARLISME. SIS ESTUDIS FONAMENTALS (Jordi Canal et al. ed., 1993); Jesús 
Millán, Contrarevolució i mobilització a l'Espanya contemporània, 154 L'AVENC REVISTA 
D’HISTRÒRIA 16-23 (1991) (Spain). 
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was attended by Valentí Almirall, the radical liberal, laic, federalist 
republican leader of the Centre Català (Catalan Center), a civil society 
association that was socially transversal and ideologically plural whose 
aim was to fight the homogenization of the liberal Spanish state and 
attain Catalan autonomy.8 Ideological tensions would split the Centre 
Català, however, and the conservative Lliga (League) would emerge as 
the leading force of Catalanism after 1888. Under its leadership it 
would soon promote another unitary platform (initially in defense of 
Catalan Civil Law), the Unió Catalanista (Catalanist Union) in 1891,9 
that would draft the first independent Catalan constitution-like 
document, the Bases de Manresa (Manresa Foundations), in 1892.10 In 
the Catalan urban industrial areas, these were times of violent 
confrontation between workers and bourgeois industrialists mostly 
expressed in terms of tensions around ownership, labor rights, and 
redistribution. Here, industrial workers, increasingly drawn to 
internationalist movements and unionization, were suspicious of 
bourgeois appeals to their integration in a corporatist Catalan nation.11 
Culturally, the Renaixensa (Renaissance) sponsored language and 
folklore recuperation following German romantic volksgeist (spirit of the 
people) movements of nation building. History, especially Medieval 
times, was underscored and instituted as the origin of the Catalan 
nation. This was narrated as a time of national expansion when 
Catalans controlled trade in the Mediterranean, when institutions such 
as the proto-parliament Consell de Cent (Council of One Hundred) were 
constituted, and when Catalan customary law–the Usatges (Customs)—
emerged. The Renaixensa was a strong moment of “invention of 
tradition” that served to strengthen the use of the Catalan language and 
highlight cultural difference. 12 
                                                                                                     
 8. See generally JOSEP M. FIGUERES, FORJADOR DEL CATALANISME POLÍTIC (1990) (on 
Valentí Almirall, a major figure of nineteen century Catalan Republican nationalism). 
 9. See Josep Pich i Mitjana, La Génesis del catalanismo político. De los inicios de la 
restauración a la crisis del Centre Català, 68 HISPANIA 437 (2008) (SPAIN). 
 10. See JOAN LLUÍS PÉREZ FRANCESCH, LES BASES DE MANRESA I EL PROGRAMA POLÍTIC 
DE LA UNIÓ CATALANISTA (1891-1899) (1992), at 93-126; Jordi Pujols et al., BASES PER A LA 
CONSTITUCIÓ REGIONAL CATALANA. MANRESA, MARÇ DE 1892 (1991) (facsimil editition of 
the document setting the guidelines for a constitution). 
 11. See generally MIQUEL IZARD, MANUFACTUREROS, INDUSTRIALES Y REVOLUCIONARIOS 
(1979). 
 12. See generally Joan Prat, El pairalisme com a model ideològic, 132 L'AVENÇ 34 
(1989) (Spain), LLORENÇ PRATS, EL MITE DE LA TRADICIÓ POPULAR (1988); SMITH, supra 
note 7, at 70-97 (on the emergence of traditions that become central to Catalan identity).  
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States of Exception 
The short-lived First Spanish Republic, founded in February 1873, 
was a federalist project that saw the first proclamation of the Catalan 
State in March 1873, a federalist declaration within a new institutional 
framework for Spain as a whole. In parallel, radical federalists activated 
an insurgent communal power movement, Cantonalismo, in Valencia, 
Castile, and Andalusia. After the Bourbon restoration of 1874, an 
important strand of federalist republicans in Catalonia would become 
the core of one of the various Catalan nationalist groups (under Valentí 
Almirall), and would vindicate a decentralized structure for Spain. 
Their program was republican, progressive, and liberal and believed 
Catalonia should become the economic and political engine of the rest of 
Spain.13  
The turn of the century saw right-and left-leaning strands of 
Catalan nationalism converge and diverge at various moments. The 
dominant party during much of this period was the conservative Lliga 
Regionalista (Regionalist League), which also favored a decentralized 
administrative structure. In 1913, the central government published an 
executive order that enabled the consolidation of Diputaciones (regional 
administrative units) into larger units, an idea that had been put 
forward by Enric Prat de la Riba, the head of the Diputació de 
Barcelona and a member of the Lliga Regionalista.14 As a result the 
Mancomunitat de Catalunya (Commonwealth of Catalonia) was formed 
in 1914 and would last formally until 1925 and effectively until the 
Dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera in 1923.15 During ten years, 
this commonwealth would develop, among others, infrastructures, such 
as roads and telephone networks; educational programs geared to 
engineering and agriculture; agricultural cooperatives to promote 
commercialization; pedagogical innovation with the introduction of the 
Montessori system; and cultural programs that strengthened the 
Catalan language and identity. While this bourgeois project of economic 
and cultural development took place, Barcelona was prey to incredibly 
violent confrontations between labor—increasingly organized in 
unions—and the industrial bourgeoisie with its army of gunmen.16 
The advent of the Second Republic in Spain (April 14, 1931) 
following municipal elections created another opportunity for 
                                                                                                     
 13. See generally VALENTÍ ALMIRALL, ANTOLOGIA DE TEXTOS (2011) (edited collection of 
the works of a major figure of nineteen century Catalan Republican nationalism). 
 14. See ENRICH PRAT DE LA RIBA, LA NACIONALITAT CATALANA (1910), at 101-115; 
TERMES, supra note 7, at 157-266. 
 15. TERMES, supra note 7, at 251. 
 16. Id. at 227-32, 293-308. 
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institutional change. In Catalonia, Francesc Macià, leader of Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya (Catalan Republican Left, ERC), proclaimed 
the “Republica Catalana com Estat integrant de la Federació Ibérica” 
(the Catalan Republic a state integrating the Iberian Federation). In so 
doing, he made an appeal to recent history (the First Republic) and to 
its promise of a federal political framework, but this was now a 
unilateral declaration, one that proclaimed the Catalan State and the 
Catalan Republic before affirming the will to confederate with the other 
Spanish Republics.17 In 1932, the first Catalan Estatut d’Autonomia 
(Charter of Autonomy) was instituted and lasted until the invasion of 
Catalonia by the Francoist army in 1939. 
In October 1934, another declaration of a Catalan State (again 
within the Spanish Republic) took place. This move was allegedly aimed 
at preserving the Republic against the assault of the anti-liberal right 
after the entry of the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas 
(Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right, CEDA)—an extreme 
right party—in the populist government headed by Alejandro Lerroux; 
but it was also an attempt to preserve liberal democracy against the 
tides of the revolutionary left. The event was part of the Revolution of 
October 1934, a working class uprising against the extreme right led by 
the socialist union (especially in Asturias and Catalonia). The then-
president of the Catalan autonomous government, Lluís Companys 
(ERC), announced the Catalan State as a safe harbor for a Spanish 
federal republic in its protest against fascism.18 In so doing, he both 
safeguarded the articulation of Catalonia to a wider political entity—the 
Spanish federal republic—and went beyond the Charter of Autonomy by 
instituting a sovereign state. The three proclamations of the Catalan 
State referred to above, all occur in “states of exception” where a 
republican moment emerges both in its revolutionary and vulnerable 
aspects.  
                                                                                                     
 17. Macià did several proclamations of the Catalan Republic on April 14th, and they 
are slightly different in how they present the relationship of the new political entity with 
the rest of Spain. Some proclomations present the integration into a confederation as a 
process and desire, others as an established fact. J.Cebrián, A. Rodríguez, J. Bassas, El 
dia que Barcelona va proclamar la República, Barcelona.cat (Apr. 11, 2013) available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J064hFCfFG4; Proclamación de la República en 
Barcelona, LA VANGUARDIA, miércoles 15 de abril 1931, at 6-7, available at 
http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/edition.html?bd=15&bm=04&by=1931&x=21&y=14.  
 18. “ . . . [P]roclama el Estado Catalán de la República Federal Española, y al 
establecer y fortificar la relación con los dirigentes de la protesta general contra el 
fascismo, les invita a establecer en Cataluña el gobierno provisional de la República, que 
hallará en nuestro pueblo catalán el más generoso impulso de fraternidad en el común 
anhelo de edificar una República Federal libre y magnífica.”Jornadas Trágicas: 
Alzamiento del Gobierno de la Generalidad, LA VANGUARDIA, Oct. 9, 1934, at 6 (Spain). 
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Franco’s dictatorial regime (1939-1975) eliminated the Estatut of the 
second Republic, recentralized institutions, and imposed Castilian as 
the only language of the Spanish state. This does not mean, however, 
that Catalans were homogeneously repressed or that they suffered 
equally under the new regime. Indeed, a sizable part of the Catalan elite 
supported a regime they saw as a bulwark against communism, and 
many benefitted from new patron-client networks and privileges.19 
Repression hit mostly those that had been affiliated with the left, 
including anarchists, trade unionists, socialists, communists, and the 
Catalan national left—especially those that had held office. 
Symbolically, the compulsory use of Castilian in all administrative 
communications and the interdiction to speak Catalan in public (which 
could be discretionally enforced) was felt as an intimate humiliation by 
Catalan speakers, which made language an extremely sensitive 
foundation of Catalan political identity.20 
Starting in the mid-1960s, some twenty years after the end of the 
Spanish Civil War (SCW), the opposition to the Francoist regime was 
getting organized. First and foremost, a strong trade union movement 
emerged that challenged work conditions and agitated for democracy 
and political freedoms.21 At the same time, various nationalist 
movements were re-organizing in the country; some like the Basque 
ETA were using violent means while others were reviving clandestine 
parties from before the SCW such as the Partido Nacionalista Vasco 
(Basque Nationalist Party, PNV) or the Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya (Catalan Republican Left, ERC) who maintained 
governments in exile in Paris. In Catalonia, the strongest party at the 
time was the Partit Socialist Unificat de Catalunya (Catalan Unified 
Socialist Party, PSUC), a communist party that had dominated the last 
                                                                                                     
 19. See generally IGNASI RIERA, ELS CATALANES DE FRANCO (1998) (presents the 
collaboration of the Catalan bourgeoisie and aristocracy with the dictatorship). 
 20. The official enforcement of Castilian as the language of administration and culture 
had precedents in various moments of centralization during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The Catalan elites, however, generally embraced Castilian as the 
language of power; they went to religious schools where the teaching language was 
Castilian and they interacted mostly in this language for official and public matters, with 
the relative exception of those that supported the cultural movement of the Reneixensa 
and were part of political catalanism. This had created a situation of diglossia related to 
class, where elites used both Castilian and Catalan according to the situation, and 
laboring classes only Castilian (when immigrant) or Catalan (when local). See Joan-Lluís 
Marfany Per a la història de la introducció del castellà a Catalunya. Alguns problemes i 
qüestions de mètode, ESTUDI GENERAL 22 (2002) 65-87, at 86-87. Hence, language 
repression hit mostly the urban middle class (petty commerce, civil servants, liberal 
professions), cultural revivalist, and the rural peasantry.  
 21. See Pere Ysàs, El movimiento obrero durante el franquismo. De la resistencia a la 
movilización (1940-1975), CUADERNOS DE HISTORIA CONTEMPORÁNEA 30 (2008), 165-184. 
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period of the war in Barcelona and had strong ties with the emerging 
labor movement. Simultaneously, cultural, educational, and religious 
associations (Òmnium, Virtelia) became key spaces for recuperating 
language, folklore, and identity. The latter were tolerated by the regime 
that confined identity aspirations to regionalist cultural associations 
and trusted the Catholic Church as an ally against “extremism.” These 
associations would become central to the development of a conservative 
strand of Catalan nationalism that connected with nineteenth-century 
Catholic regionalism. 
In 1971, the Assamblea de Catalunya (Catalan Assembly), a unitary 
opposition to the Francoist regime by all democratic parties and civil 
society associations (including the Communist PSUC), was formed. The 
program was to fight for democracy, for amnesty of political crimes, and 
for the recuperation of a Charter of Autonomy as before the SCW. This 
movement was dissolved after the first democratic elections in 1977, but 
its name was recuperated in 2012 by the Assamblea Nacional de 
Catalunya (Catalan National Assembly, ANC) in a symbolic attempt to 
link its program to its predecessor’s fight against the dictatorship. 
The Spanish Transition (1975-1978) was internationally hailed as a 
model one. It was based on political agreements and compromises 
between different parties and on an amnesty law that superseded all 
political crimes, such as the alleged ones of those that had opposed the 
dictatorship and suffered Francoist repression and the ones of those 
that had supported the regime and would therefore never be taken to 
court for their crimes. While the “fathers of the constitution”22 were 
debating the new institutional framework, violently repressed 
demonstrations claiming for “Llibertat, Amnistia i Estatut d’Autonomia” 
(Freedom, Amnesty, and Charter of Autonomy) took place in Barcelona 
in the winter of 1976.23 The first massive demonstration of the post-
Francoist era took place in Barcelona on September 11, 1977, under the 
slogan “Llibertat, amnistia i estatut d’autonomia.” Participation was 
described as featuring one million demonstrators.24 In 1978, the 
Constitución Española (Spanish Constitution, CE) was ratified in 
referendum on December 6, 1978, and in 1979, the Second Catalan 
Estatut d’Autonomia was instituted within the framework of the CE. 
                                                                                                     
 22. The Fathers of the Constitution in charge of elaborating the proposal were seven 
jurists and politicians, including a representative of the communist party PSUC and a 
representative of the “Catalan minority” but no representative of the Basque Nationalist 
party who had refused to participate. 
 23. See generally DAVID BALLESTER & MANEL RISQUES, TEMPS D’AMNISTIA. LES 
MANIFESTACIONS DE L’1 I EL 8 DE FEBRER A BARCELONA (2001). 
 24. See Onze setembre 1977: Manifestación decisiva en la historia de Cataluña, LA 
VANGUARDIA ESPAÑOLA, Sept. 3, 1977, at 3 (Spain). 
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III. NATIONALISM AND AUSTERITY: PARALLEL CHRONOLOGIES 
After a brief, symbolic return from exile of the last president of the 
Catalan Generalitat (Catalan autonomous government), Josep 
Tarradellas, from the ERC Catalan Republican Left, Catalonia had a 
nationalist conservative president for twenty-three years (Jordi Pujol).25 
A reason given for this is that the electoral system favors the rural 
under-populated regions as opposed to the urban industrial areas. In 
2003, a coalition of left parties (including socialists, republican left, and 
socialist & ecologist union) came into power in the Generalitat. One of 
their main projects was to propose a new Estatut that would enlarge the 
devolution of power to Catalan institutions (especially in juridical and 
fiscal domains). From 2004 to 2005, the Catalan Parliament debated the 
new Estatut d’Autonomia, and in 2006, a third Estatut was voted in by 
the Catalan Parliament. It was then amended by the Spanish 
Parliament, and the national conservative party, Partido Popular (PP), 
took it to the Constitutional Court (in 2006) where the Estatut was 
truncated in a ruling that deleted various articles and restrictively 
interpreted others (the ruling was pronounced on June 28, 2010).26 The 
main changes opposed the status of Catalonia as a “nation”, limited the 
creation of a separate judicial system, restricted fiscal decisions, and 
insisted on the co-official status of the Spanish language. This is the 
Estatut currently in place, which nevertheless allows for ample 
autonomy. Although the actual Charter enables the Catalan 
government to manage important resources, some directly levied and 
others directly transferred by the state, the fiscal deficit remains one of 
the central grievances against the state.  
As a result of the Constitutional Court’s decision, on July 10, 2010, a 
second massive demonstration under the slogan “Som una nació i 
nosaltres decidim” (We are a nation and we decide) took place in 
Barcelona.27 The term nació (nation) had been interpreted by the 
                                                                                                     
 25. Jordi Pujol, his wife, and several of his children have since been indicted in cases of 
corruption and tax evasion. Europa Press La Audiencia Nacional pide a Andorra todos los 
datos sobre las fundaciones panameñas utilizadas por el clan Pujol, PÚBLICO (Aug. 21, 
2017 7:07 PM). 
https://www.publico.es/politica/corrupcion-familia-pujol-audiencia-nacional-pide-andorra-
datos-fundaciones-panamenas-utilizadas-clan-pujol.html.  
Oriol Solé Altamira Los Pujol Ferrusola, una familia imputada con frentes judiciales en 
Madrid y Barcelona, EL DIARIO.ES (Apr. 26, 2017 7:36 PM) 
https://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/politica/judiciales-Pujol-reparten-Madrid-
Barcelona_0_637286681.html.  
 26. See TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL, B.O.E. n. 172, Jul. 16, 2010 (Spain). 
 27. The major newspapers inform of over one million participants. See Catalunya 
sentencia, LA VANGUARDIA, July 11, 2010, at 1 (Spain). 
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Constitutional Court as excluding sovereignty with the argument that 
the only sovereignty resides in the Spanish people. The use of nació in 
the original Estatut, however, was clearly aimed at establishing the 
substance of a right to a state, a sovereignty. It sought to supersede the 
term nacionalidad (nationality) that had been negotiated and accepted 
in the Spanish Constitution of 1978 to refer to the “historical” 
autonomous communities—those that had earned the status of 
autonomous communities before the dictatorship, thus differentiating 
between “regions” and “nationalities.”28 Shortly after, in December 2011, 
the Association of Municipalities pro-Independence (AMI) was created 
and has grown to include 83 percent of municipalities representing 43 
percent of Catalan population, the major exceptions located in the urban 
areas of Barcelona and Tarragona.29 The first president of the AMI was 
the Mayor of Vic from the conservative party Convergència i Unió 
(Convergence and Union, CiU), and he was replaced in 2015 by Carles 
Puigdemont, Mayor of Girona. He would very soon be selected by his 
party, CiU, as a replacement candidate for the position of president of 
the Generalitat after the elections of September 2015. The AMI has had 
an important role in shifting people’s focus toward the sovereignty issue 
and away from austerity problems.  
At the same time, in 2010, the financial crisis, the bursting of the 
housing bubble and subprime mortgage defaults, struck the country. In 
Spain, the bailing out of banks, the conditionalities attached to EU 
support, and the austerity cuts mobilized large protest movements. The 
new conservative government of Catalonia, voted in November 2010, 
was at the forefront of these structural adjustment measures as Artur 
Mas (CiU), conservative neoliberal, became president and immediately 
implemented important austerity cuts in health, education, and social 
services.  
Protests against austerity throughout Spain culminated in the 15-M 
Indignados movement of 2011. Demonstrations in all Spanish Plazas 
spread from the initial occupation of Puerta del Sol in Madrid and Plaça 
Catalunya in Barcelona. The latter was violently repressed by the 
Mossos de Esquadra (local police) on May 27, following orders from the 
Catalan government’s interior Minister Felip Puig, of the conservative 
                                                                                                     
 28. The distinction between nationality and nation is often ambiguous: in the turn of 
the century, political writers where the former appears often as the substance of the 
latter. Both seem to refer to the “character” of the total social organism, “the spirit of the 
people”, or “national conscience” following volkgeist ideas. See PRAT DE LA RIBA, supra note 
15, at 77-100; ANTONI ROVIRA I. VIRGILI, EL NACIONALISME at 37, 81-84 (1916). 
 29. See Associació de Municipis per la Independència, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://ca.wikipedia.org/wiki/Associaci%C3%B3_de_Municipis_per_la_Independ%C3%A8n
cia (last visited Sept. 3, 2018). 
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party CiU and a vocal Catalan nationalist; it was the first violent 
eviction of the 15-M movement.30 During 2011 and 2012, many massive 
demonstrations (up to five hundred thousand) against austerity 
occurred all over Spain in support of public health and education. The 
phenomenon of mareas (tidal waves), in support of public health (White 
tide), education (Green tide), and the environment (Blue tide) became 
ubiquitous from 2012 to 2014. In Catalonia, the phenomenon of the 
tides was also present while the Plataforma de Afectados por la 
Hipoteca (platform of mortgage victims, PAH), challenged the legitimacy 
of the mortgage defaulters’ eviction law and eventually leveraged 
support from a European Court of Justice ruling that forced Spain to 
amend its law.31 This anti-eviction movement spread from Catalonia to 
the rest of the state and became the expression of the impact of the 
financial crisis on ordinary people and the development of collective 
resistance. At the end of 2013, workers from small leftist unions (SAT, 
CGT, CNT), together with civic associations (Frente Cívico, PAH) and 
the various tidal waves (White, Green), organized a “March of Dignity” 
to Madrid from all the regions in Spain. The first March of Dignity took 
place on March 22, 2014, in Madrid and gathered around one million 
people under the slogan Pan, trabajo y techo (Bread, Work and a Roof).32 
Many participants in these mobilizations would become key to the 
development of the new party Podemos that supported a strong critique 
towards the Constitution of 1978 and the Transition agreements. 
In this conjuncture of popular mobilizations against austerity and in 
support of constitutionally protected welfare rights, the conservative 
Catalan government increased its support to an independent option and 
the national issue became hegemonic in the attention of the media. 
Although many demonstrations referring to austerity and health and 
education cuts have continued filling the streets, they are minimized by 
the press. Austerity cuts kept being implemented aggressively in 
Catalonia by the Catalan Minister (conseller) of economy who justified 
                                                                                                     
 30. See Enrique Figueredo, Puig actúa y el 15-M rebrota, LA VANGUARDIA, May 28, 
2011, at 36 (Spain). 
 31. See Juan Carlos Benito Sánchez, The CJEU and Spanish mortgage law: consumer 
protection, floor clauses and accelerated repayment, EU LAW ANALYSIS (Feb. 20, 2017), 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2017/02/the-cjeu-and-spanish-mortgage-law.html. 
 32. All of these claims refer to rights included in the Spanish Constitution: “Art. 27. 
Todos tienen el derecho a la educaci n”; “Art. 35. Todos los españoles tienen el deber de 
trabajar y el derecho al trabajo, a la libre elecci n de profesi n u oficio, a la promoci n a 
trav s del trabajo y a una remuneraci n suficiente para satisfacer sus necesidades y las de 
su familia”; “Art. 43. 1. Se reconoce el derecho a la protecci n de la salud. 2. Compete a los 
poderes p blicos organizar y tutelar la salud p blica a trav s de medidas preventivas y de 
las prestaciones y servicios necesarios”; “Art.47. Todos los españoles tienen derecho a 
disfrutar de una vivienda digna y adecuada.” C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
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the need to carry on structural adjustment because of the Catalan fiscal 
deficit with the state: Madrid ens roba (Madrid steals from us) has been 
the slogan. 
Institutional declarations defending the right to self-determination 
became frequent: on January 23, 2013, the Catalan Parliament 
approved a “Declaration of sovereignty and of the Catalan people’s 
‘Right to decide.’” On March 2014, the Constitutional Court declared the 
Catalan aspiration to sovereignty unconstitutional because “only the 
Spanish people is sovereign,” 33 but on June 26, 2013, a commission 
under the name of Pacte Nacional pel Dret a Decidir (National 
Agreement for the Right to Decide) that includes public institutions, 
parties, and civil society entities was created.34 Of the civil society 
entities, two became central to the organization of a popular, 
emotionally charged movement: Òmnium (founded in 1961 as a cultural 
association), and the Assamblea Nacional Catalana (Catalan National 
Assembly, ANC, founded in March 2012). The name of the latter is a 
direct reference to the anti-Francoist Assamblea de Catalunya, but the 
ANC is different. Its only project is to create a grassroots movement 
towards independence without any further explicit political-economic 
content. The ANC, with the support of Òmnium, will be in charge of 
organizing all the September 11 demonstrations from 2012 on,35 in an 
                                                                                                     
 33. Suplemento del Tribunal Constitucional, “BOE” 87, de 10 de abril de 2014, Sec.TC. 
77, at 85 https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2014-3885.  
 34. The entities participating are: Parlament de Catalunya, l'Institut d'Estudis 
Catalans, les Diputacions de Catalunya, l'Ajuntament de Barcelona, l'Assemblea Nacional 
Catalana, Òmnium Cultural, Convergència i Unió, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, 
Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds - Esquerra Unida i Alternativa, Candidatura d'Unitat 
Popular, la Unió General de Treballadors, la Comissió Obrera Nacional de Catalunya, la 
Unió Sindical Obrera de Catalunya i la Intersindical-CSC. See Pacte Nacional pel Dret a 
Decidir, WIKIPEDIA, https://ca.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacte_Nacional_pel_Dret_a_Decidir, 
(last visited Sept. 3 2018); El Pacte Nacional pel Dret a Decidir fa una crida a la societat 
civil a implicar-se en la consulta "des del civisme" i amb una actitud "constructiva", 




 35. The slogans and performances of these multitudinous events are: 11 September 
2012, massive demonstration “Catalunya, nou Estat a Europa” (Catalonia, a new state in 
Europe); 11 September 2013, 400km human chain (from north to south of the Catalan 
territory); 11 September 2014, massive demonstration, a human giant “V” is formed in the 
streets of Barcelona; 11 September 2015, massive demonstration under the slogan “Via 
Lliure a la Republica Catalana” (free way to the Catalan republic); 11 September 2016, 
massive mobilization under the slogan “A punt” (Ready); 11 September 2017, participants 
gathered in a giant cross meaning “adding more” and wore a yellow t-shirt with the 
sentence “referendum is democracy.” See JORDI CANAL, CON PERMISO DE KAFKA. EL 
PROCESO INDEPENDENTISTA EN CATALUÑA (2018), at 359-375.  
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annual performance of massive support for independence. Organizers 
are extremely careful to target the international audience to visually 
express the totalizing unity of the Catalan people’s identity and desire 
to be a sovereign nation. The media are essential elements in these 
demonstrations.36  
In 2014, the Catalan government commissioned a Llibre Blanc sobre 
la Transicio Nacional de Catalunya (White Book on the National 
Transition of Catalonia)37 from the Consell Assessor per a la Transició 
Nacional (Advisory Committee for the National Transition), headed by a 
prestigious Catalan jurist who had been vice president of the 
Constitutional Court. It was presented in September 2014 coinciding 
with the official announcement of the November 9 Referendum on 
Catalan independence, the first referendum that was ruled illegal by 
the Constitutional Court (CC) and was re-named a “participation 
process.”38 On September 27, 2015, elections to the Autonomous 
Parliament took place. The two parties supporting Catalan national 
sovereignty, CiU and ERC, joined together in a coalition named Junts 
pel Sí (Together in Support of Yes) and agreed to make these elections a 
plebiscite for independence, disregarding any other issue or program. 
They got a majority of seats with less than 50 percent of the vote39 but 
                                                                                                     
 36. The links between the ANC and the Catalan institutions are very strong: Carme 
Forcadell, ANC president, became the President of the Catalan Parliament in 2015. Jordi 
Sanchez, the ANC president until March 24, 2018, was candidate for the Presidency of the 
Generalitat after the December 21, 2017 elections. Both are presently imprisoned 
awaiting trial. CANAL supra at 169-171, 201-204; JORDI AMAT, LA CONFABULACIÓ DELS 
IRRESPONSABLES (2017) at 70-78; Perfil · Quim Torra, exlíder d'Òmnium proper a 
Puigdemont per presidir el Govern, DIARI DE GIRONA (May 10, 2018 8:34 PM) 
https://www.diaridegirona.cat/catalunya/2018/05/10/perfil-quim-torra/912795.html.  
 37. See generally GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA, LLIBRE BLANC SOBRE LA TRANSICIÓ 
NACIONAL DE CATALUNYA: SÍNTESI (2014) http://www.govern.cat/pres_gov/ 
AppJava/govern/gransreptes/transicionacional/275999/llibre-blanc-transicio-nacional-
catalunya.html (arguing the need for an independent state and defining its basic 
structure). 
 38. The questions of the participatory process were: a) Do you want Catalonia to 
become a State? (Yes/No); If the answer is in the affirmative: b) Do you want this State to 
be independent? (Yes/No). Turnout estimates published by media outlets range between 
37.0% and 41.6% with 80.8% of the cast votes supporting the Yes-Yes option, 10.1% the 
Yes-No, 4.5% the No option. See Fernando J. Pérez & Pere Ríos, 1,8 millones de personas 
votan por la independencia catalana en el 9-N, EL PAÍS (Nov. 10, 2014, 4:16 PM), 
https://elpais.com/politica/2014/11/09/actualidad/1415542400_466311.html; João França, 
Mapa. La participación y los resultados del 9-N comarca a comarca, EL DIARIO.ES (Nov. 9, 
2015, 5:37 PM), https://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/MAPA-participacion-
comarca_0_322668045.html. 
 39. Junts pel Sí got 39.54% of the vote and 62 seats, CUP (anti-capitalist 
independentist party) got 8.2% of votes and 10 seats, hence the partisans of national 
sovereignty added 47.74% of the votes but together had a majority of seats (72 seats out of 
135). Eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya 2015, GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA,  
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they considered they had a mandate to pursue the Full de ruta del 
process sobiranista català (Pathway of the Catalan sovereign process) 
signed in March 2015 by these parties. Honoring this mandate resulted 
in a cascade of events which I will briefly enumerate: 
In January 2016 the Comisió d’Estudi del Procés Cosntituent 
(Committee for the Study of the Constituent Process) was formed and 
headed by the president of Òmnium. 
On October 6, 2016, the Parliament resolved to carry on a 
referendum based on the “imprescriptible and inalienable right of 
Catalonia to self-determination.” It would either be agreed by the state 
or carried out unilaterally (Referendum Unilateral d’Independència, 
RUI). The Spanish government refused to agree to the referendum. 
The RUI was announced in June 2017 to be carried out on October 
1, 2017.  The referendum question asked: “Do you want Catalonia to be 
an independent state in the form of a Republic?” Neither the Spanish 
Parliament majority nor the minority in the Catalan Parliament 
(although representing a majority of votes) supported the RUI. Many 
believed the referendum did not have procedural guarantees. To many, 
it was an expression of the will to act beyond the rule of law. 
On September 6 and 7, 2017, two unconstitutional laws (the 
referendum law and the transition law) were approved by the majority 
in the Catalan Parliament against the advice of the jurists in the 
Parliament and the rulings of the Committee of Statutory Guarantees.40  
The CC declared the October 1 referendum illegal,41 and the Mossos 
d’Esquadra (Catalan police, MdE) was ordered to prevent the voting by 
requisitioning ballot boxes, preventing printing and distribution of 
ballots, and blocking the opening of polling stations. But the MdE were 
put under the command of the National Police who were sent to 
Catalonia together with the Civil Guard allegedly to support the MdE. 
In reality, the central government did not trust the MdE because their 
director had been replaced in July with a Catalan independence 
                                                                                                     
http://www.gencat.cat/governacio/resultatsparlament2015/resu/09AU/DAU09999CM_L2.h
tm (last visited Sept. 3, 2018). 
 40. See Proposició de llei del referèndum d'autodeterminació, PARLAMENT DE 
CATALUNYA, https://www.parlament.cat/web/activitat-parlamentaria/siap/index.html? 
STRUTSANCHOR1=detallExpedient.do&criteri=202-00065/11&ad=1 (last visited Sept. 3, 
2018); Proposició de llei de transitorietat jurídica i fundacional de la república, 
PARLAMENT DE CATALUNYA, https://www.parlament.cat/web/activitat-
parlamentaria/siap/index.html?STRUTSANCHOR1=detallExpedient.do&criteri=202-
00066/11&ad=1 (last visited Sept. 3, 2018); Arturo Puente, El Parlament aprueba la ley 
para declarar la independencia tras el 1-O, EL DIARIO.ES (Sept. 8, 2017, 12:47 AM), 
https://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/politica/Parlament-Catalunya-aprueba-declarar-
independencia_0_684182584.html. 
 41. See TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL, B.O.E. n. 256, Oct. 24, 2017 (Spain). 
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supporter, Pere Soler.42 
Committees for the Defense of the Referendum were formed that 
mobilized civil society to enable voting. For example, parents stayed 
with their children overnight in schools allegedly doing extra-curricular 
activities so that they could open them as polling stations in the 
morning.43 People went to vote and tried to prevent the police from 
closing the polling stations and taking the ballot boxes, defending their 
right to vote. Repression was violent and some images became viral. 
The referendum results included a turnout of 43 percent: 90.2 
percent of “Yes”; 7.8 percent of “No”; the rest white or null.44 The 
Catalan government considered this a resounding victory that ratified 
the mandate to pursue the path towards independence. On October 10, 
2017, the president of the Generalitat, Carles Puigdemont, unilaterally 
declared independence (DUI) and immediately suspended it to enable 
dialogue with the state. The president of Spain, Mariano Rajoy from the 
conservative PP, asked for a clarification as to whether independence 
had been declared or not. Receiving no response, on October 21, 2017, he 
activated Article 155 of the Constitution that suspends the autonomy of 
a region after submitting the provision to the Senate and earning a 
majority vote. The Catalan government could have de-activated the 
application of Article 155 if it called for elections but finally decided 
against it. Instead, pro-independence parties registered two resolutions 
in the Catalan Parliament, one certifying Catalan independence, the 
other stating the beginning of the constituent process and the 
application of transition law.45  
                                                                                                     
 42. Europa Press, Portavoz del Govern sobre el nuevo director de Mossos: "No es 
momento de reproches, sino de confianza", EL DIARIO.ES (July 18, 2017, 02:43 PM), 
https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Portavoz-Govern-Mossos-reproches-
confianza_0_666333857.html. 
 43. Sergi Pitarch & Pau Rodríguez, Vecinos y familias pasan la noche en decenas de 
colegios electorales para garantizar su apertura el 1-O, EL DIARIO.ES (Sept. 29, 2017, 05:31 
PM), https://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/Vecinos-familias-empiezan-electorales-garantizar 
_0_691881409.html. 
 44. Resultados definitivos del referéndum del 1 de octubre, EL DIARIO.ES (Oct. 6, 2017, 
5:05 PM), https://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/Resultados-definitivos-referendum-octubre 
_0_694331349.html. 
 45. See Arturo Puente, Puigdemont suspende la declaración de independencia para 
buscar el diálogo, EL DIARIO.ES (Oct. 10, 2017, 07:39 PM), 
https://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/politica/Puigdemont-independencia-Catalunya-
mediacion-internacional_0_695730833.html; Este es el texto firmado por los diputados 
independentistas en el Parlament, EL DIARIO.ES (Oct. 10, 2017, 10:20 PM), 
https://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/texto-firmado-diputados-independentistas-
Parlament_0_695731629.html; Iñaki Pardo Torregrosa, El Gobierno cree que el 
requerimiento queda sin respuesta y anuncia que activará el artículo 155, LA VANGUARDIA 
(Oct. 19, 2017, 10:25 AM), https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica 
/20171019/432178812964/gobierno-articulo-155-requerimiento-puigdemont-no-respuesta-
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On October 27, 2017, the president of the Spanish government 
dissolved the Catalan Parliament and called for elections on December 
21, 2017. The results of the elections, again presented as a plebiscite for 
independence, gave a majority of 70 seats to the pro-independence 
parties (ERC, JxCat, and CUP) with a total of 47.5 percent of votes.46 
In the meantime, the juridical process against those responsible for 
the RUI and the DUI started. Some were committed to preventive 
detention, some flew into “exile,” and some were released with bail 
pending trial. The judge charged them with the crimes of “rebellion,” 
“sedition,” “disobedience,” and “misappropriation of public funds.” 
The Judicialization of Politics: Making a Legal Case  
In the open conflict that confronts citizens and institutions around 
the right of secession of Catalonia, the legal question is paramount. For 
some, the repeated anti-constitutional actions of Catalan institutions 
are a dangerous attack to the rule of law that require a juridical 
response. For others, these actions are only an expression of a political 
problem that can only be resolved through negotiation and agreements. 
Those that support the latter interpretation point to the negative 
aspects of a “judicialization of politics” where political actors are 
charged and taken to court or, worse, imprisoned for their politically 
legitimate deeds. They claim that a political conflict between the 
Catalan nation and the Spanish state is being shifted to the juridical 
arena through the constant appeal to the CE and the CC. Those 
supporting this position (mostly pro-independence but not exclusively) 
underscore grievances and present factual evidence of a political 
character —although often tied to past juridical rulings—such as the 
censoring by the CC of the 2006 Estatut d’Autonomia passed in the 
Catalan Parliament and validated in a referendum by the Catalan 
people; the fiscal deficit of Catalonia in relation to the state; the lack of 
investment in infrastructures by the state (especially the blockage of the 
“Mediterranean corridor,” a crucial logistic element for the development 
of the region); and the interference with the education system in 
detriment of Catalan language immersion.  
The political grievances also include the vindication of a different 
institutional articulation with the state that would take into account the 
                                                                                                     
rajoy.html; Constitución Española: Sinopsis Artículo 155, CONGRESO, 
http://www.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/sinopsis/sinopsis.jsp?art=155&tipo=2 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2018). 
 46. See Eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya 2017, GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA, 
http://gencat.cat/economia/resultats-parlament2017/09AU/DAU09999CM.htm?lang=es 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2018). 
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historical particularity and ancient institutions of Catalonia, an aspect 
that is generally taken back to Medieval institutions and pacts and 
stresses the more recent republican periods of self-government. The 
date of 1714 (described above) that signals the loss of the Spanish War 
of Succession to the Bourbon monarch followed by the loss of the 
Charter of privileges of the Catalan Principality has become the symbol 
of the main political grievance: homogenization under an increasingly 
liberal centralized modern state.  
Presently, however, the accusation of judicialization has become 
central to the development of the conflict between Catalan sovereignty 
parties and their supporters, and the state. The state has repeatedly 
refused dialogue in terms of possible political agreements showcasing 
the evidence that a number of Catalan representatives (president, vice-
president, president of the Parliament, members of government, other 
representatives), Catalan police commanders (MdE), and civil society 
leaders (the presidents of the ANC and Òmnium) have committed illegal 
acts. The charges of “rebellion,” “sedition,” “disobedience,” and 
“misappropriation of public funds” depend on individual responsibility. 
In the case of the charge of rebellion, the main issue is to prove that 
there was “a violent rising” against the constitutional order, something 
that hinges on the definition and scope of the concept of “violence” and 
on the interpretation of certain popular tumults and collective 
aggressive actions.47  
The juridical evidence is based on existing documents that prove the 
intention and organization of secession (White Book of 2014, “Enfocats” 
guidelines)48 on the actions that were taken knowingly against the law 
in the Parliamentary sessions of September 6 and 7 (the law of 
referendum and the law of transition), on the actions enabling the 
illegal referendum to take place, and on the actions and documents 
unilaterally declaring independence after the results of the illegal 
                                                                                                     
 47. Violence for certain crimes (e.g. gender violence) spans from speech acts and 
psychological harassment to actual physical violence. In the case of rebellion, the meaning 
of “violence” in the intent of the legislators seems to have been restricted to the use or 
threat of physical violence (e.g. like in an armed uprising). See José Precedo, 
ENTREVISTA: Javier Álvarez, catedrático de Derecho Penal, EL DIARIO.ES (Nov. 14, 2017, 
09:35 PM), https://www.eldiario.es/politica/dirigentes-independentistas-barbaridades-
conducta-rebelion_0_707980198.html; Javier Pérez Royo, La rebelión del Govern: un delito 
imaginario, ARA.CAT (Dec. 13, 2017, 08:52 PM), https://www.ara.cat/es/opinion/javier-
perez-royo-rebelion-govern-delito-imaginario_0_1923407880.html. 
 48. See The "Auto" referenced is Auto de 21 de marzo de 2018. It can be found here 
http://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Poder-Judicial/Tribunal-Supremo/Noticias-
Judiciales/El-juez-Pablo-Llarena-procesa-por-un-delito-de-rebelion-a-13-de-los-
investigados-en-la-causa-por-el-proceso-secesionista-de-Cataluna (last visited Dec.13, 
2018) (Spain). 
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referendum. The preventive imprisonment without bail of Oriol 
Junqueras (ERC) then vice president of the Catalan government, and of 
the presidents of the civil society associations (ANC and Òmnium, 
popularly known as “the Jordis”) have been based on the evidence of 
“danger of flight” as president Carles Puigdemont (PdCAT) and several 
other members of the then Catalan government had escaped into “exile” 
in Brussels.  
The use of juridical argumentation, however, is not limited to the 
state system, as the parties supporting a Catalan “right to decide” (not 
all of them secessionist, as some favor a federalist approach) appeal to 
the “fundamental rights of self-determination” of a “people” where the 
main difficulty hinges on the definition of “people.” Although some use 
the historical account of the 1714 defeat as the evidence of territorial 
“occupation” by a centralizing state, the jurists and politicians writing 
the Llibre Blanc sobre la Transicio Nacional de Catalunya (White Book 
on the National Transition of Catalonia of 2014) appeal to the case of 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence and an International 
Court of Justice advisory opinion (2010) that it was in accordance with 
international law.49 They stress the right of a “permanent minority” 
that is being unjustly treated by the state to exercise the right of self-
determination. The “national or territorial minority” of a democratic 
state can have their “reasonable aspirations to self-government and the 
agreements of territorial autonomy” systematically violated by the 
central state, and the only solution is full sovereignty.50  
This is a juridical argument based on another kind of evidence: that 
of an existing “national or territorial minority” whose collective rights 
are systematically violated within a state. The coupling of a “national” 
and “territorial” argument produces ambiguity as to the actual 
constituents—the collective defined as “the people”— whose aspirations 
and rights are being violated. The juridical argument is that these are 
“fundamental” universal human rights regarding the freedom of the 
Catalan people and hence are of a higher (juridical and moral) order 
than the Spanish Constitution. 
                                                                                                     
 49. See Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice: Accordance with 
international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, 
UNITED NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/ 
files/ef_KOS_Advisory-opinion_bilingual.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 50. GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA, supra note 38, at 20 (“Aquestes violacions inclouen la 
impossibilitat de conciliar demandes (raonables) d’autonomia regional amb l’estructura de 
l’Estat i la intervenció i el qüestionament (sistemàtic) de l’autonomia territorial per part 
de l’Estat central malgrat els pactes formals existents . . . . L’únic remei possible a aquesta 
situació és la modificació de les relacions entre la majoria i la minoria territorials fins a 
posar-les en un pla d’estricta igualtat, concedint l’estatus de plena sobirania a la minoria 
nacional.”). 
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On a more pragmatic issue, the imprisonment of politicians and the 
international extradition order of the Supreme Court judge against the 
fugitive representatives indicted51 point to the various scales at which 
the different agents are judicializing the process. Generally speaking, 
the strategy of the pro-independence lawyers, politicians, and media has 
been to (1) point to the politicization and non-independence of the 
judicial Spanish system, (2) claim that those imprisoned are charged for 
their ideological position and hence are “political prisoners,” (3) define 
the former situations as a political involution of Spanish democracy, and 
(4) appeal to Europe and its democratic juridical system as a superior 
legal order (whether expressed in concrete states such as Belgium or 
Germany, in the Court of Justice of the EU, or the International Court 
of Justice). 
Legality and Legitimacy: the Politics of the “People” 
An important argument for those supporting independence is that 
legitimacy trumps legality. Indeed, it is impossible to legally declare 
independence within the present constitutional order; thus, the force of 
right needs to be based on the legitimacy of popular will. What kind of 
majority expresses the popular will? What kind of minority will be left 
to grieve the violation of its popular will? These are the issues that are 
being debated through media discourse and mobilizations in present-
day Catalonia. But first, a word of caution: although massive 
demonstrations have become the norm in the nationalist debate, what is 
less obvious is that these demonstrations have completely displaced, 
silenced, and transmogrified the massive protests against austerity that 
took place from 2011 to 2013 in Catalonia as in the rest of Spain.52 The 
                                                                                                     
 51. As of August 2018, the extradition order has been revoked. In July 2018 the High 
Court of the region of Schleswig-Holstein in Germany ruled that the former President of 
the Catalan government could only be extradited for misappropriation of public funds but 
not for rebellion or sedition. As a result, the Spanish judge did not accept this ruling and 
declared the extradition inadmissible. See María-Paz López, Alemania acepta extraditar a 
Puigdemont sólo por malversación y no por rebelión, LA VANGUARDIA, 
https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20180712/45850607483/puigdemont-extradicion-
alemania-malversacion.html (last updated July 13, 2018). 
 52. Very recently, important protests against pension cuts all over Spain have also 
been followed in Catalonia. Interestingly, these protests have the strongest participation 
in industrial and post-industrial regions of Spain. See Público/Efe Miles de jubilados se 
concentran en toda España para reclamar unas pensiones dignas Público, PÚBLICO (Feb. 
22, 2018 12:24 PM) https://www.publico.es/economia/miles-jubilados-concentran-espana-
reclamar.html; Erlantz Gude Una histórica marea por unas pensiones «dignas» pone en 
aprietos al Gobierno, EL CORREO (Mar. 17, 2018 4:53 PM) 
https://www.elcorreo.com/economia/pensiones/marea-jubilados-echa-20180317165245-
nt.html#.  
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argument that the fiscal deficit with the state is responsible for the cuts 
to public services that the autonomous government implemented 
implicitly presupposes (and sometimes explicitly exposes) that the end 
of austerity will come with an independent Catalan state. If we look at 
the map of revenue per capita and the incidence of independent votes in 
Catalonia, we get an image similar to that of the Brexit voters in the 
UK: lower revenue areas (in this case mostly rural agricultural ones), 
which have been extremely dependent on redistributive transfers 
directly from the Catalan government for years, are the strongest 
supporters, although often the funds distributed come from the EU via 
state and regional governments (such as Feder funds).53 
What is the evidence for a majority? It is the evidence of numbers 
first. But what numbers count is debatable. For example, in the last two 
plebiscitary elections, the discrepancy between the majority of seats in 
Parliament for secessionist parties and the majority of votes for non-
secessionist parties renders the claim of a majority vulnerable.54 During 
the two referendums (November 9, 2014 and October 1, 2017), the 
resounding majority in favor of independence (80.8 percent and 90.2 
percent) came at the expense of a low turnout, respectively around 36.6 
percent and 43 percent.55  
Likewise, the massive demonstrations of September 11, always 
described as gathering around one million participants,56 are arguably a 
                                                                                                     
 53. See Raúl Sánchez, Belén Picazo & Yuly Jara, La demografía del 21D, así votó cada 
grupo social, EL DIARIO.ES (Dec. 22, 2017, 7:20 AM), 
https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Resultados-mapa-voto-independentista-
Catalunya_0_720578676.html; Raúl Sánchez et al., La Catalunya que nos deja el 21D. Un 
análisis de los resultados, EL DIARIO.ES, https://elecciones.eldiario.es/ 
analisis21D/?_ga=2.251450950.1918933085.1535293046-530758308.1508688262 (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2018) (displaying a sociological analysis of the votes). 
 54. See Miquel Noguer, Los independentistas ganan las elecciones y pierden su 
plebiscito, EL PAÍS (Sept. 28, 2015, 4:10 PM), https://elpais.com/ccaa/2015/ 
09/27/catalunya/1443387513_045607.html (discussing the election of September 27, 2015); 
21D Elecciones Catalanas, EL PAÍS, https://elpais.com/tag/elecciones_catalanas/a/ (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2018) (discussing the election of December 21, 2017). 
 55. See Mario Ríos, El 9-N: Historia de dos países, EL DIARIO.ES (Nov. 12, 2014, 8:51 
AM), https://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/Historia-paises_0_323717686.html (discussing the 
referendum of November 9, 2014); 9N 2014, GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA, 
http://www.participa2014.cat/resultats/dades/ca/escr-tot.html; El Govern anuncia una 
participación de 2,2 millones de personas, con un 90% para el ‘sí’, EL DIARIO.ES (Oct. 2, 
2017, 12:48 AM), https://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/Govern-anuncia-participacion-
millones-personas_0_692930704.html (discussing the referendum of October 1, 2017). 
 56. Depending on the political orientation of the media and of the institutions 
calculating participation, the numbers vary from 500,000 to over a million. See Diada 
2018: este gráfico es un intento de representar objetivamente la evolución de asistentes, 
EUROPA PRESS, http://www.europapress.es/nacional/noticia-diada-2017-grafico-intento-
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popular expression of support, but they are far from representing all the 
Catalan population or even a majority. They are nevertheless put 
forward by supporters of independence and by international media57 as 
being a clear expression of the will of a majority of the “Catalan people.” 
The metonym is often treated as a fact, as evidence in the struggle for 
legitimacy: Catalan people (as a whole) support independence and (as a 
whole) hold nationalistic grievances against the Spanish state. Although 
this position is repeated in discourses and the media, in reality, the 
leaders of the national transition process in the strategic document 
“#EnfoCATS” (ca. 2017)58 are clearly aware that they do not have a 
social majority support, and one of their main objectives is precisely to 
“widen the social base.” In this document,the population of Catalonia is 
ranked on a continuum according to their degree of conviction for the 
independence cause as: (1) “hyperventilated59 conviction,” (2) “historic 
conviction,” (3) “recent but frail conviction,” (4) “fraternal 
regenerationists,60” (5) “uncertain,” (6) “presently impervious,” and (7) 
“convinced of NO.” Each of these categories will require a specific 
approach to convince them of the benefits of secession. Hence, the 
“evidence of numbers” of actual popular support is interpreted in 
different ways by the strategists based on whether they are performing 
the metonym of a majority for the media and the general public (a 
“People”) or whether they are analyzing the necessary tactics to gain a 
real social majority. 
The metonym of the Catalan people has an additional consequence: 
the corporatist expression of a homogenous “nation” welded in a 
transcendent identity recognition claim. Massive demonstrations and 
the ubiquity of symbols such as the Catalan independence starred flag 
(estellada)61 hide a complex reality where identities are often tied to 
histories of migration and class differentiation. Supporters of 
independence describe the humiliation they have suffered historically at 
                                                                                                     
representar-objetivamente-evolucion-asistentes-20170909085120.html (last updated Sept. 
11, 2018). 
 57. The International media’s sources have been mostly fed by various news agencies 
subsidized by the Catalan government, such as Diplocat, Catalan News Agency, Vilaweb, 
and TV3. Reporters have been seduced by the righteousness and democratic claims of 
independence supporters (highlighting alleged repression by and undemocratic aspects of 
the Spanish state). 
 58. #EnfoCATs: llegiu el document que ha deixat Junqueras a la presó, ELPERIODICO 
(Dec. 6, 2017, 06:40 PM), https://www.elperiodico.cat/ca/politica/20171205/enfocats-
document-junqueras-preso-6475171. 
 59. Overexcited 
 60. Supporters of a new constitutional structure and often partisans of an agreed legal 
referendum. 
 61. The legal Catalan flag does not have a star. 
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the hands of Spanish governments (or in another metonym “Madrid”): 
their fight for dignity is tied to achieving sovereignty. From a different 
experience, the migrants that came to Catalonia in the 1960s from the 
poorer regions of Spain have ambivalent feelings, as they recall the 
humiliation they suffered as second-class citizens (xarnegos), but they 
are grateful for the economic opportunities of social mobility that the 
local industry provided them. The second generation, born and raised in 
Catalonia and educated in Catalan speaking public schools, often feels 
they have a dual identity: they are Catalan Spaniards. If we look at a 
map of voters supporting what the media call “unionist” parties,62 the 
coincidence with the old immigrant working class belt is striking. Sadly, 
in the present conjuncture, these voters who used to favor social 
democratic or socialist parties (mostly as a result of a past of militant 
trade unionism) are now voting on the grounds of identity positioning, 
that is, mostly against secession. This has displaced their vote toward a 
neoliberal right wing party Ciudadanos (Citizens) that was formed to 
counter the rise of Catalan nationalism and defend the Spanish 
language in 2006.63 Many of these voters are described by some Catalan 
nationalists as “fascist” supporters of the extreme right, the Spanish 
government, or the allegedly undemocratic judicial actions of the state. 
For most of those targeted, this characterization is very far from their 
actual social and political genealogies, as many arrived in Catalonia 
because of their socialist or anarchist past and the systematic 
repression and exploitation they suffered from police and landowners 
after the SCW,64 although the nationalist antagonism has shifted many 
voters away from the Catalan Socialist party (PSC) to the neoliberal 
Spanish nationalist party Ciudadanos in the recent elections. So called 
unionists have been silent until recently, surrendering the floor of 
public space mobilizations to independence supporters. To show the 
strength of their numbers, however, they also organized several massive 
demonstrations in October 2017 to counter totalizing narratives about 
Catalan “people.”65 
                                                                                                     
 62. Parties that do not support independence. 
 63. See Raúl Sánchez, Así se destiñó de rojo a naranja el cinturón de Barcelona, clave 
para el 21D, EL DIARIO.ES (Dec. 16, 2017, 7:32 PM), https://www.eldiario.es/ 
politica/destino-naranja-cinturon-rojo-Barcelona_0_718479182.html. 
 64. See generally GEORGE A. COLLIER, SOCIALISTS OF RURAL ANDALUSIA: 
UNACKNOWLEDGED REVOLUTIONARIES OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC (1987) (an 
anthropological and historical account of the overall movement of socialists in Andalusia 
and their migration as a result of repression after the SCW). 
 65. See Cientos de miles de personas reclaman en Barcelona la unidad de España, EL 
DIARIO.ES (Oct. 8, 2017, 11:22 AM), https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Miles-personas-
reclaman-Barcelona-Espana_0_695030592.html; Miles de personas se manifiestan en 
Barcelona en defensa de la unidad de España, EL DIARIO.ES (Oct. 29, 2017, 12:03 PM), 
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In this context, the battle for legitimacy through numbers is linked 
to the tacit evidence of different experiences that have historically 
produced complex identities and many declensions of the Catalan 
people. As evidentiary proof of a unitary nationalist spirit, however, 
numbers are moralized and citizens ranked into “good” and “bad,” 
pushing towards corporatist and exclusionary identities in Catalonia 
and in Spain.  
Memory, Performance and Mobilization 
Evidence struggles are also fought in terms of symbolic 
performances. Those most frequently used by independence supporters 
refer to past historical memories of 1714, the Spanish Civil War (SCW), 
political exile, and political repression during the dictatorship and 
Transition years. Less frequent reference is made to major international 
figures of national liberation (like Ghandi or Mandela). These references 
seek to create emotional connections that will reinforce legitimacy by 
providing evidence of a long history of human and political rights 
violations against Catalonia. They do not go uncontested. A common 
rejoinder points to the incommensurability of the comparisons or even to 
intentional misrepresentation of the past. In the juridical arena, the 
symbolic connections are also present as both the Llibre Blanc sobre la 
Transicio Nacional de Catalunya (White Book on the National 
Transition of Catalonia) and the Supreme Court’s rebellion indictment 
show.66  
The SCW, the dictatorship, and the Transition are still very present 
memories in Spain. The fact that the Transition was built on a general 
amnesty and a pact of silence about the previous regime’s atrocities and 
that the Law of Historical Memory (2007) was abandoned as soon as the 
conservative Popular Party (PP) came into power in 2012 makes the 
past still present in today’s politics. The Transition period was 
                                                                                                     
https://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/barcelona/Partidarios-Espana-manifestan-Barcelona-
legalidad_0_702379795.html.  
 66. The former gives a long list of historical grievances; the latter mentions how, in 
order to inflame the public against a police search in the Catalan department of economy, 
the defendant cried “¡No pasarán!”, a clear reference to the communist leader Pasionaria’s 
cry in the defense of Madrid against the rebel troops of Franco during the SCW. With this, 
the judge makes a direct (and unwarranted) connection between the defendant’s actions 
and the SCW violence, and between the defendant and communist ideology (arguably an 
evidently “bad” ideology). See Auto de 21 de marzo de 2018 can be found here 
http://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Poder-Judicial/Tribunal-Supremo/Noticias-
Judiciales/El-juez-Pablo-Llarena-procesa-por-un-delito-de-rebelion-a-13-de-los-
investigados-en-la-causa-por-el-proceso-secesionista-de-Cataluna (last visited Dec.13, 
2018) (Spain). 
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simultaneously a continuation of the Francoist regime, a recuperation of 
the political status quo ante of the Republic, and an attempt to become a 
modern democratic European nation. This resulted in a parliamentary 
democratic system albeit within a constitutional monarchy following the 
dynastic head of state design re-instituted by Franco. The past is indeed 
present in everyday politics as stories about families’ political 
positioning during the war, their politics during the dictatorship, and 
the struggles of the transition are still references that divide the 
political moralities of people. Likewise, reference to this recent history is 
publicly used to assess the trustworthiness of politicians, often tracing it 
to the political positions of their ancestors. Hence, using symbolic 
connections to the past is an extremely useful way to legitimate or de-
legitimate actions or individuals. It also contributes to positioning 
present actions within an emotionally charged political lineage.  
An example of this is the construction of the former president of the 
Generalitat’s escape as an “exile”, the “legitimate government in exile,” 
and his followers’ insistence that he is still the legitimate president. 
This created a parallel between the application of Article 155 of the 
Constitution dissolving the Catalan Parliament after the unilateral 
declaration of independence and the flight of the Republican Generalitat 
in 1939 from the Francoist troops. The designation of the “Free Space of 
Brussels” as the seat of the legitimate Catalan government, the creation 
of the Council of the Republic, and the creation of an Assembly of 
Representatives that would operate in parallel to an executive legal 
Catalan government in Catalonia (February 2018), is a creative 
reference to the parallel government of the Generalitat in exile during 
the dictatorship. This historical reference legitimates the position of the 
deposed government and its actions and creates a new kind of evidence 
strengthened by the moral connotations of the past. At the same time, it 
attempts to make this dual structure legal through changes to the law 
of the Catalan government and presidency that would be approved by 
the Catalan Parliament (and very certainly declared unconstitutional by 
the CC).67 
On a different front, performances, such as the massive September 
11 demonstrations, are evidence of the peaceful character of the Catalan 
mobilizations for independence. They express the democratic aspect of 
the movement and its non-violence as the “smiling revolution.” Violence 
is a feature of the state and in particular of a Spanish right wing PP 
government whose members are in the lineage of the dictatorship.68 
                                                                                                     
 67. See LEY 13/2008 DE LA PRESIDENCIA DE LA GENERALIDAD Y DEL GOBIERNO. 
 68. Actually, violence is also a feature of the Catalan government as was obvious 
during the repression of the 15-M Indignados social movement in Barcelona. See AMAT 
supra note 36, at 68-69.  
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This image of the demos peacefully making a legitimate claim in the 
street, claiming the public space of the nation, and embodying “freedom 
of expression” is a message to the world: there is only one legitimate 
demos, and we are it. There is no doubt that supporters of independence 
are extremely successful in the performative aspect of the evidence 
struggle over legitimacy, especially in its international projection. 
Meanwhile, the state hides behind the judicialization of the conflict 
although upholding legitimacy in the face of continuous performances of 
historical grievances and of the will of the “Catalan people” remains a 
challenge, at least in Catalonia and the international arena.  
One of these symbolic performances took place during the Easter 
holiday, in March-April 2018. On March 30, groups of independence 
supporters planted yellow crosses in several beaches in the province of 
Girona. The crosses had words such as “freedom,” “democracy,” 
“republic,” “equality,” “solidarity,” and “justice,” symbolizing the death 
of liberty and other political virtues.69 The Committees in Defense of the 
Republic (CDR), a civil society group that has organized most of the 
symbolic performances such as the tying of yellow ribbons all over 
Catalonia asking for the freeing of “political prisoners,” were also 
responsible for the planting of crosses. In this action, they included the 
beach of Argélès-sur-mer in France, an area that Catalan nationalist 
call Northern Catalonia, and where Spanish Civil War refugees were 
held in a concentration camp in February 1939 when they crossed the 
border fleeing Franco’s troops. The action was clearly meant to recall 
this past event and to make parallels between repression and fascism 
then, and its alleged repetition in the present, forcing the flight to exile 
and imprisoning those that fought for the Catalan Republic and for 
national freedom. However, this was not well received by people whose 
kin had crossed to France and ended in Argélès in 1939. In a tweet, 
Patricia, an ordinary Catalan citizen, comments this action as follows: 
“[m]y mother’s family, socialist miners from Andalusia, ended at Argélès 
in the winter of 1939. Today, those that consider us inferior and call us, 
the grand-children [of those socialist miners], colonial settlers70 use that 
                                                                                                     
 69. See Pere Vilanova, De primaveras y cruces, EL PAÍS (Apr. 6, 2018, 6:28 PM), 
https://elpais.com/ccaa/2018/04/05/catalunya/1522942158_526982.html; Los CDR plantan 
cruces amarillas en las playas de Port de la Selva, Cadaqués y Argelers, EUROPA PRESS 
(Mar. 31, 2018, 5:47 PM), http://www.europapress.es/catalunya/noticia-cdr-plantan-cruces-
amarillas-playas-port-selva-cadaques-argelers-20180331150439.html. 
 70. An accusation thrown by some radical Catalan nationalists at the immigrants from 
Andalusia is that of having been settlers catering to the Francoist intent to reduce 
Catalan identity through the massive migration from Southern Spain. See Manifest del 
Grup Koiné a favor del català com a única llengua oficial, EL PERIÓDICO (Apr. 1, 2016 / 
Feb. 16, 2018 2:32 PM) https://www.elperiodico.cat/ca/politica/20160401/grup-koine-
manifest-catala-unica-llengua-oficial-5018986 ; Manuel Cuyàs Colonització involuntària, 
58 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 26:1 
suffering. They are shameless.”71 
Nevertheless, the Catalan “unionists” are at pains to find a 
collective voice that would appeal to a different kind of legitimacy (and 
this may be impossible precisely because of multiple and violently 
conflictive past political genealogies among them during the SCW and 
the Transition). Recently, however, some have countered with a political 
performance: the claim for a new nation, Tabarnia, that would comprise 
the provinces of Tarragona and Barcelona —the richest and most 
industrialized areas which sustain a fiscal deficit with the rest of 
Catalonia. Legitimacy for this claim rests on mimicking some of the 
arguments put forward by sovereignty supporters, but it also refers to a 
memory of repression. This imaginary nation is a creation of the theatre 
director of Els Joglars, Albert Boadella, whose play La Torna (1977) was 
considered an offense to the military during the Transition and led him 
to be indicted in a military trial. He was imprisoned and escaped to 
Belgium, re-entered Spain and was arrested, and finally was pardoned. 
As the first repressive judicial act against freedom of speech of the 
Transition, this event triggered massive mobilizations in defense of 
“freedom of expression.” The poster and logo that were created then in 
support of the right to freely express ideas and as a sign that democracy 
was not yet accomplished have been plagiarized by Catalan nationalists 
as the main image in support of the imprisoned Catalan politicians and 
of ideological freedom of speech. Boadella, however, is now a staunch 
critic of Catalan nationalism who has veered to the right since his 
earlier days, and has (1) vindicated the different context of his original 
critique to the dictatorship, and (2) responded with the creative 
performance of a new secessionist nation within Catalonia: Tabarnia. 
CONCLUSION: SHIFTS IN STRUGGLE 
Different kinds of evidence are used to argue, justify, and mobilize 
political action, but the evidence is about truth. Direct evidence, 
circumstantial evidence, and testimonies about present and past 
injustice are all contending in the arena of factual truth-making and 
foreclosing the possibility of pluralist interpretations up for public 
debate.72 While some render the Constitution and its definition of Spain 
as the only sovereign nation a dogma of faith, others present the nature 
of the Catalan “people” as an essential truth. In the struggle, truth, 
                                                                                                     
EL PUNT AVUI (Apr. 7, 2016 2:00 AM) http://www.elpuntavui.cat/opinio/article/8-
articles/956085-colonitzacio-involuntaria.html.  
 71. Patricia (@patgato), TWITTER (Mar. 31, 2018, 11:30 AM), 
https://twitter.com/patgato/status/980105167348621312. 
 72. See Hannah Arendt, Truth and Politics, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 25, 1967, at 49. 
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opinion, and ideology, become equivalent and democratic pluralism 
unviable. The struggle is about making factual truth unassailable 
through evidence, it is not a struggle about contestable interpretation 
and opposing projects. Thus, it is about the capture of politics by truth-
making struggles that attempt to render a particular political project 
incontestably self-evident.  
While there is plenty of evidence that illegal actions were committed 
in the fall of 2017, the political project that backed them might be 
legitimate, and evidence is brought forth by its supporters. The Catalan 
conflict is a political one that cannot be resolved judicially, and the kind 
of factual evidence that the judge proposes (documents proving intent to 
secede and actions against the law) operates among other forms of 
evidence, mostly historical, symbolic, and performative. 
Ethnographically, we observe a complex evidence struggle that attempts 
to legitimate political action. Mobilization of support for the different 
political objectives rests on an entanglement of legal and emotional, 
dystopian and utopian, and past and present modes of reason. But cui 
prodest?  
The fight between nationalisms (Catalan and Spanish) is producing 
a shifting understanding of inequalities, namely a shift from social to 
territorial, and identity arguments of differentiation. The confrontation 
is against the external offender defined in essentialist terms (such as 
“Madrid steals from us,” “we are supporting the lazy Andalusians,” or 
“those greedy Catalans”). This nationalist strategy hides the long-term 
alliance between the conservative elites in both regions and their joint 
support of neoliberal policies, large corporations, and financial capital. 
Presently, competition between local spaces as foreign investment sites 
has become increasingly central in global capitalism and has produced 
tensions around re-scaling control over regulatory frameworks. The 
question is: who will benefit from the re-scaling process in Catalonia? 
Local political elites and some powerful economic actors hope that their 
ability to control local resources (in particular taxation) would benefit 
them. Their ability to shape extra-local regulatory regimes (such as the 
European Union or bilateral agreements) would also increase due to 
direct negotiation with international regulatory bodies, and hence their 
power would be unmediated. Yet the real value of national sovereignty 
(even democracy) in a global economy regulated by unelected 
transnational institutions, such as the IMF, WB, or ECB is 
questionable, as the Greek case exemplified in 2015. We might be 
witnessing the emergence of a post-global world, however, where 
barriers to circulation (of goods and people) expand, albeit selectively. In 
this context, nationalism and borders may appear as a protection that 
would provide “citizenship rents.” This was the promise of Brexit and of 
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many populist nationalist parties in Europe, such as the Lega (League) 
in Italy. In this uncertain situation after a devolutionary moment in the 
1980s, the nation-state structure (and the supra-national EU structure 
with it) seems to be entering a phase of re-centralization that is 
countered by regional power holders. 
It is difficult to know how this would affect ordinary people’s 
livelihoods. In Catalonia, some of the more vocal secessionists in the left 
(the anti-capitalist CUP) say that the downscaling of regulation from 
the Spanish to the Catalan state would enable the expansion of the 
welfare state and would give more leverage to popular mobilization, 
which would widen the scope for participatory democracy.  
For the time being, the rise of nationalism, populism, and 
sovereignty struggles in a post-global world raises frightening memories 
of the past in Europe. As in the past, the evidence used to mobilize 
people is multiple, often countering legality on the grounds of legitimate 
grievances and performing legitimacy in public spaces and by reference 
to the past. At the supra- and sub-national levels, the rule of law and 
the pluralist process of liberal democratic deliberation is challenged by 
concrete agents that use symbolic and performative evidence to get 
political leverage and accomplish change. Downscaling the state might 
be a response to the territorial dislocations brought about by neoliberal 
globalization, but nationalist, corporatist, and totalizing understandings 
of the issues at stake might just shift the representation of the conflict 
instead of dealing with its causes. 
 
